06-6
Working Paper Series

“What else do we have to cope with?”

Gender, paid and unpaid work during Argentina’s last crisis

by Valeria Esquivel

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"What else do we have to cope with?"
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Abstract

This paper aims to sketch gender relations in Argentina at the awakening of devaluation in order to explore the effects of macroeconomic developments during 2002 on families and women. The paper argues that the devastating effects on welfare in the immediate post-devaluation period were neither restricted to monetary variables nor gender neutral.

The paper makes use of the only existing country-wide time use database, which was collected in 2001 as part of a Living Conditions Survey. The focus of the paper is on women and men situated and embedded in a variety of family relationships, which entail different total unpaid work burdens and, more importantly, differing compromises on who shoulders the unpaid work burden and the shares involved. Participation rates on housework, childcare and childcare of very young children are analysed through multivariate analysis. The paper also shows that a household's average unpaid workload, lifecycle and income can explain women's and men's shares in unpaid work.

Making use of these estimations, the paper assesses the impacts the Argentine crisis has had on the intra-household distribution of housework and the reallocation of care work.

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"What else do we have to cope with?" Gender, paid and unpaid work during Argentina's last crisis

INTRODUCTION

The structural adjustment programmes that were put in place in most Latin American countries in recent decades have failed to deliver on their promise. In most cases, if results are measured in terms of growth, labour market outcomes and poverty reduction, performance has been poor (Gasparini *et al,* 2005). These negative outcomes resulted to a considerable extent from macroeconomic performances that have been prone to recurrent crisis, rendering growth highly uneven while generating high average unemployment rates and volatility in family incomes.

Two decades after the Mexican debt default, a second debt crisis hit Latin America, led this time by Argentina and driven by capital withdrawals that made the exchange rate unsustainable. The second round of macroeconomic adjustment promoted by the IMF had similar features as its predecessors, aiming at making countries honour their foreign debts and rapidly reopen their financial markets[1]. The magnitude of the social effects brought about by macroeconomic policies that had been supported, financed and conditioned by the Fund where hardly taken into account in the renewed requests for fiscal austerity (Torre, 2005). As in previous large scale adjustments, there has been little acknowledgement of the gender effects entailed by crisis and its aftermath (Elson and Cagatay, 2000).

By devaluing the national currency (the peso) in January 2002 and defaulting on its external debt, Argentina ended the fixed exchange rate regime-cum-market friendly reforms and free capital mobility. By the second quarter of 2002 Argentine GDP plummeted 15% in annual terms and the unemployment rate reached its all-time high, 21.5%. The previous three year-long recession hadn't been much better: GDP had deteriorated from its peak in 1998 and the fourth quarter of 2001 at an annual average rate of 4.4%, accumulating 15.4% loss. The unemployment rate was 18.4% just before devaluation. Not surprisingly, economic depression, unemployment and rising inflation caused an upsurge in income poverty levels which rose from 38.3% to 57.5% of the total population in only one year[2].

There is a growing literature which indicates that women are more affected than men by reversals of growth, particularly in developing countries (Singh and Zammit, 2000; CEPAL, 2003). Inadequate social security systems mean that macroeconomic 'automatic buffer mechanisms' associated with counter-cyclical public expenditure are non-existent, and are compensated for by heavier burdens borne by women and families as they strive to make ends meet through intensifying their unpaid (reproductive/domestic) work (Beneria, 2003).

Argentina's last crisis offers a relevant case to study how living conditions were shaped as a result of economic crisis. The aim of this paper is to sketch gender relations in Argentina at the awakening of devaluation in order to explore the effects of macroeconomic developments during 2002 on families and women. The thesis herein is that the devastating effects on welfare in the immediate post-devaluation period were neither restricted to monetary variables –income poverty

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[1] Only recently (January 2006) Brazil and Argentina have paid their debts to IMF in order to avert conditionality. Less than a year before, Argentina left foreign debt default behind by achieving a 76% acceptance of its restructuring proposal (see Torres, 2005).

[2] October 2001 to October 2002. Measures of moderate absolute poverty (headcount).

and inequality, which have been studied elsewhere (Esquivel and Maurizio, 2005) – nor gender neutral.

The paper makes use of the only existing country-wide time use database, which was collected in 2001 as part of a Living Conditions Survey. The focus of the paper is on women and men situated and embedded in a variety of family relationships, which entail different total unpaid work burdens and, more importantly, differing compromises on who shoulders the unpaid work burden and the shares involved. In doing so, the paper extends existing income-based well-being evaluations adding class, gender and life cycle dimensions to them (Arriagada, 2002; 2005).

The paper states it theoretical background in section I, while presenting a short account on labor market results and social policy in Argentina immediately after devaluation in section II. The main characteristics of the time use survey in which analysis is based as well as some methodological issues are discussed in section III. Section IV describes the family and family relationships typology adopted, while section V reports time use patters based on that typology. Sections VI and VII show the results of multivariate analysis of time use data and use it to investigate crises' and social policy repercussions on the level and distribution of housework and care work.

I. BACKGROUND

Traditionally, families –those living together in households and related by kinship– have been the social sites of biological reproduction and domesticity, of mutual trust, love, tension and dispute. Families are structured according to cultural, class and lifecycle factors, which shape their size and the number of dependents (Jelin, 1998). Within families, cooperative, conflictive and exchange relationships take place among the genders and the generations in complex hierarchical and asymmetric patterns (Ariza and de Oliveira, 2000). The gender division of labor, namely the productive and reproductive working time of women and men are among the many aspects families negotiate.

Defined in contrast to the classical concept of productive labor, reproductive labor is non-marketed, non-monetized, unpaid work that encompasses housework and care work, especially but not uniquely of the elderly and children (Elson, 1999). Still disproportionably borne by women, unpaid work crucially supports the daily reproduction of human life sustaining other types of work, particularly paid work (Picchio, 1995). It is in this latter sense that the paid and unpaid working times of all family members, and not only that of women, become deeply gendered (Wheelock et al, 2003).

Macroeconomic crisis impacts families' income levels and stability as well as access to social security, health, education and other services, all factors that have a direct influence on well being. In times of crisis, families' paid and unpaid work balance is altered to absorb market disequilibria and adjust to them. Bearing this adjustment may be costly –or even not possible for some or all of its members– according to families' structure and the degree of inequality *within* them (Cagatay, Elson and Grown, 1995). In times of crisis, the welfare of all family members, and particularly that of women, depends on the interaction between macroeconomic functioning, family structure and state intervention through social policy (Valenzuela, 2004), all aspects that determine unpaid work burdens, employment opportunities and resource availability (Chant, 2003).

II. WOMEN, EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL POLICIES DURING THE CRISIS

According to the last Population Census (2001), Argentine women represent 51.2% of the total population. Their life expectancy is higher than men (77.7 years as compared to 70.6 years) and they have an average of 2.4 children. In October 2001, the poverty feminization index was 96.6% and remained unchanged throughout the following year[3].

Labor market indicators at the height of the crisis deteriorated less drastically for women. By May 2002, unemployment had risen from 16.6% to 20.2% among women and from 16.2% to 22.3% among men. In a rapidly deteriorating context, the lower female unemployment rate resulted from a gendered employment dynamic, since between May 2001 and May 2002, employment rates fell 4 percentage points (pp) among men and less than 2pp among women. Contrary to the 'buffer hypothesis' that argues that women are the first to be fired, the fact that female employment rates fell less sharply than men's was linked to labor market segregation. Indeed, by the end of the Convertibility Plan, female employment was concentrated in relatively more stable occupations (particularly social and personal services): women worked predominantly in commerce (21.1%), as domestic workers (17.9%), in education (16.1%) and in social and health services (16%). Paid housework services and education were typically female activities (INDEC, 2003).

A year later, 52.6% of female wage workers in the private sector held a precarious job, an average that was 20pp greater than male wage workers. Women were overrepresented among unregistered wage workers and public sector workers, and underrepresented among registered private sector wage workers (Siempro, 2003a). The effects of the crisis on middle-income households explains the drastic decline in paid household employment; this sector accounted for only 14.6% of total female employment in October 2002. Most employed women who lived in poverty held casual or precarious jobs, typically as domestics, unregistered wage workers or own-account workers (Cortes, 2003).

When the tendency towards net employment destruction reversed beginning in October 2002, female labour force participation rose almost 2pp –as compared to October 2001. There is evidence that this aggregate behaviour was the result of women's response to the "Program for Unemployed Head of Households" or *Jefes Plan* as it became known.

Whether understood as a cash-transfer program, an emergency employment program or as an Employer of Last Resort program[4], it is undisputable that the *Jefes* Plan became the backbone of post-devaluation social policy, reaching over two million households by the end of 2002. Beneficiaries had to take part in training, working or community activities during four to six hours a day in return for a cash-transfer that covered less than a typical family's poverty line income. The plan targeted unemployed household heads (self-declared), be they women or men.

Unexpectedly for officials who designed the Plan (and who expected from 400,000 to 800,000 beneficiaries at most), women were the highest proportion of beneficiaries (69% according to a Population Survey Module designed specifically to monitor the Plan). Most of these women were not entitled to benefit as they had been economically inactive spouses in the immediate pre-devaluation period[5].

[3] This index would be 100% if the proportion of women among the poor equaled the proportion of women in the total population, so the proportion of women among the poor was a little lower than their proportion among the population during this period (strictly, it rose to 97.2%).

[4] For accounts on *Jefes* Plan from different perspectives, see Barbeito *et al* (2004), Wray and Tcherneva (2004) and Goldberg (2004). For a gender analysis, see Pautassi (2003) and Rodríguez Enríquez (2005). For official evaluations, see MTESS (2004 and 2005).

[5] Other differential characteristics include beneficiaries' average household size (which is greater than average), mid-education credentials and presence of sons/daughters below 18 years old, this last feature stemming from selection criteria. Though not reaching the very poor, the Plan was well targeted: 93.3% of beneficiaries lived in poor or very poor households (Maurizio and Groisman, 2004).

Based on panel data, Monza and Giacometti (2003) show that female labor force participation of beneficiaries was 57% just before entering the Plan (May 2002). These authors claim the Plan had a 'labor market activation effect', namely the attraction of individuals not usually attached to the labor market. Alternatively, the plan can be viewed as new labor demand that showed the size of hidden unemployment (Cortes *et al,* 2004). In any case, the Plan helped those women who became beneficiaries to alleviate their families' income losses and become employed (even if in precarious and unregistered positions[6]), but had the aggregate impact of increasing the female unemployment rate by pushing up female labour force participation rates. By October 2002, the female unemployment rate equalled that of men's (18% as opposed to 17.8%)[7].

III. TIME USE DATA

Argentina has not carried out nation-wide time-use studies based on activity diaries. However, *Encuesta de Calidad de Vida 2001 (*ECV-2001 or Living Conditions Survey)[8] allows for the first time to study many aspects of living conditions and, among them, the gender distribution of domestic chores *within* households and the total time spent on them by different family members (Siempro, 2003b).

ECV-2001 provides up to date living conditions data on the Argentine urban population, including social programs coverage. It was based on a country-wide sample of 26,000 urban dwellings, where households were identified and surveyed. Un-weighted micro data used in this paper comprises 19,605 households and 50,714 individuals over 14 years old, 23,948 men and 26,766 women. The sample is representative of a total universe of 8,160,000 households and corresponds to the almost 30 million people living in towns of 5,000 inhabitants or more (ECV-2001, 2003a).

ECV-2001 continued and strengthened an effort started in 1997 with *Encuesta de Desarrollo Social* (Social Development Survey) including issues not tackled before, notably a new "daily life" module. The module included exploratory questions on a group of domestic tasks and the time devoted to them *as a whole* measured in hours per day during week days and weekends (Siempro, 2003b). The questionnaire followed the *task survey* model and presented respondents with a list of yes/no questions on predefined tasks. ECV-2001 included only six tasks related to domestic chores (doing the laundry and ironing, minor repairing, cooking, cleaning, washing dishes and doing the shopping), and two related to care (childcare and elder/sick care). Regrettably, due to the fact that time devoted to each task is unknown, ECV-2001 puts on equal footing those individuals who perform a task every day with those who only seldom perform it. If these differences are gendered (as evidence indicates) results might be biased.

Task surveys tend to underestimate reproductive working time, capturing less time than self administered diary-type surveys due to the fact that they ask retrospectively about the set of tasks performed and time used in them, as respondents tend to 'average' recalled time and associate it to 'standard' or normal time use patterns. As in ECV-2001, multitasking is normally not accounted for. Another methodological problem of task surveys is that short task lists can be biased and

[6] Plan's positions are precarious on account of their low-wage, low-productivity, involuntary part-time characteristics. They are unregistered due to their lack of non-wage benefits. Rodriguez Enriquez (2005) points to the fact that by making impossible for beneficiaries to hold other occupation, these positions constitute an "informal work trap".

[7] These figures are not comparable to those of May 2002 (it cannot be said that unemployment rates 'decreased' from May 2002 to October 2002) due to well documented seasonal effects.

[8] ECV-2001 database was made available in the public domain in mid 2003, but was lately withdrawn from SIEMPRO webpage (www.siempro.gov.ar).

incomplete, though no list can be exhaustive. Unspecified tasks were mentioned by 6.5% of male respondents and 31.7% of female respondents, showing evidence of incomplete task selection.

ECV-2001 also had a section on *Early Childhood (0-4 years old)* that included a module about the main care provider for each child. This module enables analysis to analyze (albeit indirectly) of the gender distribution of childcare of very young children.

However important these drawbacks are, they cannot undervalue ECV-2001 as the first attempt to capture *reproductive labor* in a nation-wide, statistically representative survey. ECV-2001 allows us to analyze the distribution of reproductive labor by age, gender and family type, and to correlate it with other features of individuals and households and their access to social services (particularly childcare facilities). By including labor market indicators as covered by the Population Household Survey, ECV-2001 can also show the relationship between reproductive and productive labor.

IV. Families, Gender and Living Conditions in Argentina

The focus of this paper is on families, operationally defined as those households in which kinship relationships between the household's head and some/all of other household's members exist[9]. The adopted typology differentiates among families according to lifecycle and structure (e.g. presence of children, spouse, seniors and other relatives), and between families and non-family households (see *the box below* for a thorough description of each type).[10]

Household Types

Non-family households:

Unattached individuals: one individual.

Other non-family arrangements: one or more individuals with no family relation with the household head.

Families:

Married couples without children: household head and spouse without children or grandchildren. Other relatives might live in the household as well.

Two-parent families: household head and spouse, with at least one son or daughter and no grandchildren. Other relatives might live in the household as well, except for the household head's mother, father, mother-in-law or father-in-law.

Lone-parent families: household head *without* spouse, with at least one son or daughter. Other relatives might live in the household as well, except for the household head's mother, father, mother-in-law or father-in-law.

Tri-generational families: household head with spouse, sons/daughters and/or grandchildren; household head, sons/daughters and the household head's parents or parents in-law..

Other family arrangements: household head's relatives living together other than the above mentioned types.

[9] Household headship is self reported. Women do frequently report themselves as heads in the absence of spouse, but this is not always the case.

[10] A broader typology was introduced to analyze time use patterns in Montevideo, Uruguay, by Aguirre and Batthyány (2005).

Table 1 shows the distribution of households according to this typology: 13.7% of households are unattached individuals; married couples (with and without children) represent 59% of total households and lone-parent families amount to 11.4% of households. In addition, 11.8% of households are tri-generational households, including families with the household head's grandchildren and those in which the household head's or spouse's parents live in a household with children[11].

Table 1: Households and population by household/family type

Household type	*% households*	*% population* Men	*% population* Women	*% population* Total
Non-family households				
Unattached individuals	13.7	3.2%	4.5%	3.8%
Other non-family	0.9	0.5%	0.6%	0.6%
Families				
Married without children	13.7	8.3%	7.9%	8.1%
Two-parent families	45.3	60.3%	53.2%	56.6%
Lone-parent families	11.4	8.2%	11.1%	9.7%
Tri-generational families	11.8	17.6%	20.0%	18.8%
Other family arrangements	3.2	2.0%	2.7%	2.3%
	100.0	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: Own calculations based on ECV-2001 (weighted).

Table 1 also shows the distribution of the population by household type. Two-parent families make up 56.6% of the population, while lone-parent families make up 9.7%, and tri-generational families account for 18.8%. When split by gender, the most frequent family type is still the two-parent family among women (53.2%) and certainly among men (60.3%). Women living alone are relatively more frequent than average and the same is true for women living in lone-parent families.

Table 2 shows the population distribution by household type, income quintile and household head's gender. Two parent families are overrepresented in the first and second income quintiles among male-headed households, while the population living in lone-parent families (10.2%) are doing so largely in lone-mother households[12]. Tri-generational families are also overrepresented in the first and second income quintiles irrespective of household head's gender. Families where the household head's sons/daughters are present (irrespective of their age) make up 92% of the population in the first and second income quintiles as compared to 84.3% of the total population.

Among female-headed households, unattached women are overrepresented on average and in the upper income quintiles, pointing to the fact that affluent women – particularly the elderly – are the ones who choose and can afford to live alone. On the opposite side of the income distribution, 30% of the population living in mother-headed households have per capita incomes that correspond to the first quintile.

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[11] The last Nationwide Population Census also collected in 2001 reflects this household composition: nuclear households amounted to 63% of total households (married couples, two-parent and lone- parent families), among which 16% were lone-parent families. Unattached individuals were 15% of total households. Of the 27% of female headed households, 31% were unattached individuals, 30% were lone mother households and 25% were extended families (Beccaria and Groisman, 2005).

[12] Population living in lone-father households are only 1.7% of the total population living in male-headed households.

Although high, these data do not support the equivalence of female household headship and poverty, as literature has recently stressed (Chant, 2003; CEPAL, 2004) – the last figure corresponds to only 3% of the total population. Also, the proportion of the population living on incomes in the first and second income quintiles is not significantly different for female-headed households (51%) and male-headed households (50.5%).

Table 2: Population by Per Capita Income Quintile, Household/Family Type and Household Headship

Male household head						
Household type	*1st quintile*	*2nd quintile*	*3rd quintile*	*4th quintile*	*5th quintile*	*TOTAL*
Non-family types						
Unattached individuals	1.8%	0.6%	1.6%	2.5%	6.5%	2.2%
Other non-family	0.0%	0.1%	0.2%	0.9%	0.9%	0.3%
Families						
Married without children	4.3%	5.5%	10.5%	14.3%	22.6%	10.0%
Two-parent families	72.0%	68.8%	67.5%	67.6%	59.9%	68.0%
Lone-parent families	1.4%	1.4%	1.7%	2.3%	2.0%	1.7%
Tri-generational families	19.5%	23.0%	16.9%	10.1%	5.7%	16.4%
Other family arrangements	0.9%	0.7%	1.5%	2.2%	2.4%	1.4%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Female household head						
Household type	*1st quintile*	*2nd quintile*	*3rd quintile*	*4th quintile*	*5th quintile*	*TOTAL*
Non-family types						
Unattached individuals	4.5%	4.3%	16.2%	19.8%	29.3%	12.7%
Other non-family	0.6%	0.5%	2.0%	5.1%	2.1%	1.8%
Families						
Married without children	0.6%	1.0%	2.6%	4.8%	3.7%	2.2%
Two-parent families	11.0%	9.4%	8.8%	9.3%	9.1%	9.7%
Lone-parent families	47.3%	45.1%	35.3%	37.9%	38.5%	41.9%
Tri-generational families	33.2%	35.1%	27.7%	14.6%	9.3%	26.0%
Other family arrangements	2.8%	4.5%	7.4%	8.5%	8.1%	5.7%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Total						
Household type	*1st quintile*	*2nd quintile*	*3rd quintile*	*4th quintile*	*5th quintile*	*TOTAL*
Non-family types						
Unattached individuals	2.4%	1.3%	4.5%	6.2%	11.5%	4.4%
Other non-family	0.2%	0.1%	0.5%	1.8%	1.2%	0.6%
Families						
Married without children	3.4%	4.7%	9.0%	12.3%	18.4%	8.3%
Two-parent families	57.3%	58.1%	55.8%	55.3%	48.6%	55.7%
Lone-parent families	12.5%	9.3%	8.4%	9.8%	10.1%	10.2%
Tri-generational families	22.8%	25.2%	19.0%	11.1%	6.5%	18.5%
Other family arrangements	1.4%	1.4%	2.7%	3.5%	3.7%	2.3%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Population	*1st quintile*	*2nd quintile*	*3rd quintile*	*4th quintile*	*5th quintile*	*TOTAL*
Female population	13.5%	12.6%	10.0%	8.8%	7.3%	52.1%
Male population	12.9%	11.6%	9.0%	7.7%	6.6%	47.9%
Total	26.4%	24.2%	19.0%	16.5%	13.9%	100.0%
Population living in male-headed households	20.0%	19.8%	15.3%	13.0%	10.8%	78.9%
Population living in female-headed households	6.4%	4.4%	3.7%	3.5%	3.1%	21.1%
Total	26.4%	24.2%	19.0%	16.5%	13.9%	100.0%

Source: Own calculations based on ECV-2001 (weighted).Differences with totals in Table 1 are due to missing data in household income.

Table 3: Mean value for Females and Males by Household Types (standard deviation in parentheses)

	All		*Household Types*													
			Unattached individuals		Other non-family		Married without children		Two-parent families		Lone-parent families		Tri-generational families		Other family arrangements	
	Females	*Males*	*Females*	*Males*	*Females*	*Males*	*Females*	*Males*	*Females*	*Males*	*Females*	*Males*	*Females*	*Males*	*Females*	*Males*
First Income Quintile (households)	0.17 (0.38)		0.13 (0.3)		0.08 (0.28)		0.07 (0.26)		0.19 (0.39)		0.22 (0.41)		0.24 (0.43)		0.12 (0.33)	
Fifth Income Quintile (households)	0.16 (0.36)		0.32 (0.47)		0.24 (0.43)		0.27 (0.44)		0.11 (0.32)		0.13 (0.34)		0.05 (0.22)		0.18 (0.39)	
Has washing machine	0.76 (0.42)		0.50 (0.50)		0.50 (0.50)		0.82 (0.38)		0.84 (0.38)		0.74 (0.44)		0.76 (0.42)		0.64 (0.48)	
Has car/ motorcycle	0.48 (0.50)		0.22 (0.41)		0.20 (0.40)		0.54 (0.50)		0.61 (0.49)		0.33 (0.47)		0.44 (0.50)		0.29 (0.46)	
Number of mothers of children 0 - 4	-		-		-		-		0.39 (0.49)		0.17 (0.39)		0.70 (0.70)		0.10 (0.36)	
Number of children 0 - 4	-	-	-		0.02 (0.16)		-		0.47 (0.72)		0.18 (0.47)		0.70 (0.86)		0.06 (0.29)	
Number of children 0 - 14	-	-	-		-		-		1.58 (1.43)		0.91 (1.27)		1.77 (1.56)		0.22 (0.65)	
Number of sons/ daughters	-	-	-		-		-		2.42 (1.41)		1.98 (1.27)		2.09 (1.69)		-	
Number of grandparents/ in Laws	-	-	-		-		0.04 (0.18)		-		-		0.25 (0.47)		0.3 (0.49)	
Number of grandchildren	-	-	-		-		-		-		-		1.37 (1.30)		-	
Number of other relatives	-	-	-		-		0.05 (0.28)		0.06 (0.33)		0.12 (0.54)		0.39 (0.72)		1.31 (1.28)	
Number of other non-relatives	-	-	-		-		0.05 (0.61)		0.08 (1.03)		0.08 (1.01)		0.16 (1.54)		0.23 (2.10)	
Members	-		1 (0.00)		2.37 (0.78)		2.09 (0.38)		4.50 (1.45)		3.12 (1.38)		5.72 (2.43)		2.66 (1.22)	
Domestic servants present	-		0.000 (0.00)		0.091 (0.29)		0.003 (0.06)		0.004 (0.06)		0.004 (0.06)		0.002 (0.05)		0.004 (0.07)	
Has < secondary school	0.64 (0.48)	0.67 (0.47)	0.65 (0.48)	0.64 (0.48)	0.30 (0.46)	0.24 (0.43)	0.66 (0.47)	0.67 (0.47)	0.62 (0.49)	0.66 (0.47)	0.65 (0.48)	0.72 (0.45)	0.68 (0.46)	0.70 (0.46)	0.56 (0.50)	0.57 (0.49)
Has secondary school but < university degree/ diploma	0.19 (0.39)	0.17 (0.38)	0.20 (0.40)	0.25 (0.43)	0.60 (0.49)	0.65 (0.48)	0.21 (0.41)	0.20 (0.40)	0.19 (0.39)	0.17 (0.38)	0.21 (0.41)	0.16 (0.37)	0.16 (0.36)	0.12 (0.33)	0.30 (0.46)	0.34 (0.47)
Has a diploma/ university degree	0.08 (0.27)	0.05 (0.22)	0.13 (0.34)	0.10 (0.30)	0.08 (0.27)	0.09 (0.28)	0.11 (0.31)	0.11 (0.31)	0.08 (0.27)	0.05 (0.22)	0.08 (0.27)	0.04 (0.18)	0.04 (0.20)	0.02 (0.15)	0.11 (0.32)	0.06 (0.23)
Age (respondents over 15)	39 (17.8)	41 (18.6)	62 (17.3)	50 (18.5)	37 (23.5)	30 (13.7)	55 (17.0)	58 (17.5)	35 (13.6)	36 (14.6)	40 (17.8)	31 (16.2)	41 (19.9)	38 (19.0)	50 (23.2)	38 (19.2)

Table 3 (cont.)

	All		*Household Types*													
			Unattached individuals		Other non-family		Married without children		Two-parent families		Lone-parent families		Tri-generational families		Other family arrangements	
	Females	*Males*	*Females*	*Males*	*Females*	*Males*	*Females*	*Males*	*Females*	*Males*	*Females*	*Males*	*Females*	*Males*	*Females*	*Males*
Participation in housework [a]	0.68 (0.46)	0.48 (0.50)	0.95 (0.20)	0.92 (0.26)	0.88 (0.33)	0.88 (0.33)	0.95 (0.23)	0.72 (0.45)	0.62 (0.48)	0.45 (0.49)	0.71 (0.45)	0.48 (0.50)	0.67 (0.47)	0.40 (0.49)	0.84 (0.37)	0.69 (0.46)
Participation in childcare [a]	0.35 (0.48)	0.15 (0.36)	0.14 (0.34)	0.07 (0.26)	0.07 (0.26)	0.03 (0.16)	0.18 (0.38)	0.06 (0.25)	0.37 (0.48)	0.19 (0.39)	0.28 (0.45)	0.08 (0.27)	0.46 (0.50)	0.17 (0.37)	0.17 (0.37)	0.09 (0.27)
Participation in unpaid hours [a]	0.68 (0.46)	0.50 (0.50)	0.96 (0.20)	0.93 (0.25)	0.88 (0.33)	0.88 (0.32)	0.95 (0.22)	0.73 (0.45)	0.62 (0.49)	0.45 (0.50)	0.71 (0.45)	0.48 (0.50)	0.67 (0.47)	0.42 (0.49)	0.84 (0.37)	0.70 (0.46)
Unpaid hours/ day	5.00 (5.85)	2.88 (6.98)	4.62 (8.41)	3.29 (6.97)	3.22 (3.91)	2.47 (2.48)	4.88 (4.82)	2.96 (7.23)	5.24 (5.41)	2.76 (6.71)	4.58 (6.35)	2.99 (7.02)	5.06 (6.09)	3.03 (8.11)	4.05 (5.49)	2.75 (4.92)
Employment rate [b]	0.39 (0.42)	0.67 (0.39)	0.32 (0.46)	0.58 (0.49)	0.31 (0.36)	0.56 (0.43)	0.33 (0.46)	0.53 (0.49)	0.40 (0.44)	0.75 (0.35)	0.49 (0.42)	0.49 (0.44)	0.35 (0.32)	0.60 (0.38)	0.34 (0.39)	0.52 (0.44)
Paid hours/ day [c]	7.48 (12.01)	10.11 (14.65)	7.48 (12.98)	9.47 (13.41)	10.79 (23.30)	8.94 (3.71)	8.25 (15.32)	9.58 (9.84)	7.21 (10.91)	10.35 (14.61)	7.90 (13.37)	10.71 (21.9)	7.05 (9.33)	9.68 (14.27)	9.05 (19.84)	8.96 (11.06)
Unpaid hours' share	56% (0.29)	30% (0.25)	100% (0.00)	100% (0.00)	50% (0.21)	40% (0.14)	73% (0.22)	35% (0.20)	55% (0.27)	24% (0.15)	60% (0.30)	34% (0.24)	38% (0.22)	18% (0.14)	53% (0.25)	39% (0.23)
Number of members >14	-	-	1 (0.00)	1 (0.00)	1.22 (1.08)	1.01 (1.24)	1.04 (0.22)	1.03 (0.19)	1.41 (0.68)	1.50 (0.76)	1.38 (0.76)	0.83 (0.90)	2.27 (0.97)	1.68 (1.10)	1.41 (0.90)	1.03 (0.94)
Unpaid workload per individual > 14	-	-	4.05 (7.86)		2.77 (2.75)		3.46 (4.09)		3.67 (4.03)		3.98 (5.12)		3.64 (3.84)		3.08 (2.96)	

Source: Own calculations based on ECV-2001.
[a] Calculated as a positive answer to doing housework, care work and unpaid hours for individuals > 14
[b] Calculated as employed women/men over total women/men >14 en each household
[c] Paid hours a day calculated as total hours per week / 5 of those employed

Family types have different average sizes and comprise different complexities in family relationships (see Table 3[13]). In married couples[14] without children and two-parent families both household head and spouse are present. Two-parent families include 1.58 children (19% between the ages of 0-4)[15] on average, with 0.39 members being mothers of young children. Their average size is 4.5 members. Lone-parent families are relatively small (3.12 members) and have on average 0.91 child (with 9% of children between 0-4) and 0.17 members being mothers of young children.

Tri-generational families comprise grandparents, household head's parents or parents-in-law (0.25 member on average) and their sons/ daughters (2.09) or grandchildren (1.37)[16]. They are the largest (5.72 members on average) among families and include the larger average presence of children (1.77), young children (0.70) and mothers of young children (0.70). All family types can also include other relatives and other non-relatives.

Income-related variables as well as those that are *proxies* for permanent income also vary by household type. On average, 17% of households earn per capita incomes in the first income quintile while 16% do so in the fifth income quintile. Lone-parent and tri-generational families are relatively concentrated in the first income quintile, while non-family households and childless couples are relatively concentrated in the fifth income quintile. In contrast, time saving devices (washing machine and car/motorcycle, usually associated with permanent income, are less common in non-family households and overrepresented in two-parent families.

The distribution of educational credentials shows two distinctive cases, namely other non-family and other family arrangements, households where both women and men have higher than average educational credentials. As expected due to the presence of the elderly (who are less educated in average), tri-generational families show the highest concentration in the lower educational strata.

V. UNPAID DOMESTIC AND CARE WORK IN ARGENTINA

Descriptive information on paid and unpaid work is presented for women and men in Table 3, disaggregated by household type.

Participation in housework is calculated as a 'yes' answer to any of the six domestic chores respondents were asked about. Participation in childcare is calculated as a 'yes' answer to one question on childcare, which was general enough to comprise almost any active care: *"During last week, did you take care of children (like feeding/ bathing/ dressing them, taking them to the playground, etc.)?"* Given that the reference period (last week) is relatively long, a positive answer on any form of reproductive unpaid work cannot account for differences in participation intensity.

In non-family households both women and men engage in housework in equivalent proportions. In sharp contrast, family arrangements show significant gender differences. On average, less than half of men do unpaid housework, while over 60% of women do. These differences are particularly striking in two-parent and tri-generational families, which comprise over 75% of the total population. Only 40% of men engage in housework in tri-generational families while 67% of women do; in two-parent families these figures are 45% and 62% respectively.

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[13] Data in Table 3 are not weighted and therefore corresponds to variables' means and standard deviations as are included in multivariate analysis.
[14] Or living together by mutual consent.
[15] This is calculated as the ratio between the average number of children between the ages of 0-4 (0.39) and the average number of sons/daughters (2.42).
[16] Married without children and other family arrangements also include household head's parents or parents-in-law but do not include grandchildren.

As expected, participation in childcare is important in families where there are children (under 15 years old)[17]. In spite of low average levels, gender differences seem to be more pronounced than in housework. 19% of men take care of children in two-parent families, a figure that is doubled by women participation in childcare (37%); in tri-generational families, 46% of women do childcare work while only 17% of men do.

Among families, men do engage in unpaid work (housework, child and elder/sick care) more in childless couples and other family arrangements, both family types that correspond to more positive answers by women. While men do engage less in unpaid work in tri-generational families, women do so in two-parent families. However, female participation in unpaid work in these families is never below 60%.

Table 3 also shows average unpaid hours a day devoted to all housework tasks as an average of weekdays and weekends. The main result is that *Argentine women devote two more hours each day to reproductive unpaid housework and care work than Argentine men*[18], a gender difference comparable to findings in developed and developing countries. This is the case in married without children, tri-generational families and two-parent families. In this latter type of family, the gender difference in unpaid work reaches two and a half hours. Differences between female's and male's unpaid work are significantly less than two hours among lone parent families (because men work more than average) and in other family arrangements (because both women and men work less than average).

Gender differences in absolute unpaid hours might be related to differential labour market participation of women and men, if male breadwinners are still the norm. Average employed members by household type (as a proportion of members > 14) allows us to analyze this issue. In effect, women on average work fewer hours for pay than men in all household types except for lone-parent households. Women are employed in greater proportions in lone-parent and two-parent families, but they work fewer hours for pay when there are children in the household. Men are have more hours of paid work in two-parent families, and work for pay longer hours in lone parent families. It is in this latter family type that the gender difference in paid hours are the lowest.[19]

Another reason one should analyse aggregate unpaid hours levels with caution is in relation to households' unpaid workload. Family life-cycle (the presence of children and elders), household size, and in general the ways daily life is organized affect total workload, as is evident from Table 3 'unpaid workload per individual > 14' line. These figures can also be interpreted as the average 'equitable' workload per person by household type.

Hours of unpaid work per individual are the greatest in lone-parent families (almost 4hs a day in average), followed by two-parent and tri-generational families. Only unattached individuals (who are not families) work more at home on average than lone-parent families' members.

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[17] Notice, however, that there are positive answers in non-family arrangements. These figures might be the result of not restricting childcare to children related to the household's head, nor to other household's or non-household's children.

[18] Strictly, two hours and eight minutes more..

[19] The way data are collected does not allow matching paid and unpaid working time, leisure time and sleep time in a 24 hour day. To make unpaid and paid working time comparable, paid working time (gathered on weekly bases) has been distributed along weekdays, an assumption that might explain high absolute hours of paid work. Alternatively, weekly hours could have been spread along a 7 days' working week. Considering labour market legislation in Argentina and most usual job arrangements, the chosen methodology seems more realistic than the alternative one.

Household size *and* absolute workload seem to be behind these figures. Notice, for example that in tri-generational families, average 'contributing' size (in terms of individuals that can take up unpaid work, namely those > 14[20]) is almost four members but per individual workload is similar to that of two-parent families[21], a fact that is related to workload. Not only are tri-generational families the largest in terms of total members, but they also have the highest 'reproductive' dependency rate (average members as a proportion of average contributing members). On the opposite side, other family arrangements' average individual workload is the least among families (a fact that might be connected to the low child presence and greater possibilities of distributing workload). These families along with childless couples show the lower reproductive dependency rates.

The ways unpaid workload is distributed by gender depends on the differential presence of females and males, along with unpaid workload levels. However, and with the exception of women older than 14 living in tri-generational families (who are 2.27 in average), all other women take up well over 50% of the workload, with peaks in childless couples (73%) and women in lone-parent families (60%)[22]. Like women, men take up less share in tri-generational families (18%), but unlike their female counterparts, they participate in no more than 35% of household share in almost all other family types with the exception of other family arrangements, where they take up 39% of unpaid workload. Not surprisingly, men do not reach 50% of unpaid workload either on average or in any of the household types analysed other than unattached individuals.

Table 4: Mean value for Mothers of children < 5 by Household Types (standard deviation in parentheses)

	All mothers	*Family Types*			
		Two-parent families	*Lone-parent families*	*Tri-generational families*	*Other family arrangements*
Mother is main care provider	0.82 (0.38)	0.85 (0.36)	0.74 (0.43)	0.79 (0.41)	0.79 (0.42)
Has secondary school but < university degree/ diploma	0.28 (0.45)	0.27 (0.45)	0.26 (0.44)	0.29 (0.45)	0.11 (0.31)
Has a diploma/ university degree	0.13 (0.33)	0.16 (0.37)	0.10 (0.30)	0.06 (0.24)	0.07 (0.26)
Employed	0.41 (0.49)	0.40 (0.49)	0.60 (0.49)	0.37 (0.48)	0.32 (0.48)
Household heads	0.09 (0.29)	0.04 (0.19)	0.95 (0.22)	0.02 (0.15)	0.00 (0.00)
Live in a female-headed household and are not household heads	0.10 (0.45)	0.00 (0.03)	0.04 (0.20)	0.32 (0.47)	0.36 (0.49)
Presence of domestic servants	0.005 (0.07)	0.010 (0.08)	0.010 (0.08)	0.000 (0.04)	0.000 (0.00)
Childcare facility	0.19 (0.39)	0.19 (0.39)	0.24 (0.43)	0.17 (0.38)	0.11 (0.31)

Source: Own calculations based on ECV-2001.

A last descriptive point is related to mothers of infants (Table 4). Information on childcare of young children has been accrued to her/his mother in order to correlate mother's partaking in

[20] This definition is related to questionnaire design; we are not suggesting children do not engage in unpaid work but that we simply cannot capture it. However, as we strive to separate dependency (generating net unpaid work requirements) from contributions, we will assume the presence of children increase workload (as it is the case in multivariate analysis, see below).

[21] Except for unattached individuals, average 'contributing' household members can be calculated by adding female and male averages.

[22] These are the average of individuals' shares per household type by gender (not necessarily add up to 100% in the aggregate).

labor market and family type to the ways childcare of very young children (that are considered as the most time-demanding)[23] is provided.

Childcare of infants is mainly a task of mothers[24]. Children younger than 5 years-old stay with their mothers most of the day in 82% of cases; a proportion that is slightly greater on average in two-parent families. In all other family types, mothers are the main childcare provider in 74% of cases or over.

These last figures are also related to labour market participation rates as described in section 2. When labour market insertion of young children's mothers is analyzed, only mothers living in lone-parent families (95% of which are household heads) are significantly employed (60%). In all other family types, mothers are employed in 40% of cases or less and resort to childcare facilities in only 19% of the cases[25]. The presence of domestic servants[26] is rare on average.

VI. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

Analysis of the multiple factors that determine unpaid and care work is developed in three stages. Firstly, participation rates on housework and childcare are analysed according to family type and presence of children, aiming at identifying the ways life cycle and family relationships might affect whether women or men do take up housework and childcare, and whether these patterns are affected by household income.

Secondly, focus turns to mothers of young children (up to 5 years-old) and the factors that explain whether they are the main childcare provider. Actual day-care attendance of any household's children below 5 is used as a proxy of the availability of childcare facilities for the family.

In the third stage, the share of individuals' unpaid work hours (including childcare and care for the elderly/sick) is analyzed separately for women and men. Interestingly, while models that explain hours' levels are not statistically significant, it is women's and men's shares in unpaid work that can be explained by a household's average unpaid workload, lifecycle and income.

A. Who does unpaid domestic and care work?

For the full sample, two probit models of the correlates of doing housework and childcare work are reported below[27]. Key explanatory variables include an individual's gender and family relationship[28] with the household head, as well as family type. With the exception of 'number of children', 'number of females > 14' and 'number of males > 14', all other variables are dummies either for the individual or the household. Models included constant terms.

[23] In some cases, where the mother has more than one child, the characteristics of the *youngest* daughter/son where chosen.
[24] Notice that the question referred to the main care provider was *"Who does the kid stay with during most of the day?"* When children are taken care of by attending boarding schools/ day-care facilities *and* staying at home, it was up to the respondent to ponder how many hours most of the day is.
[25] This variable is computed for *any* household child attending a childcare facility irrespective of the time, aiming at capturing (albeit imperfectly) paid or state-provided childcare availability.
[26] The domestic servants the data refers to are those who live in the household most of the week. Other paid housework (domestics paid by the hour, who are widespread in urban affluent areas) is not captured by ECV-01.
[27] Results for a probit model for the correlates with elder care were not statistically significant and therefore is not reported.
[28] The inclusion of family relationships renders age statistically insignificant.

Table 5 reports estimated coefficients that show positive housework participation associated with personal and household characteristics. Among personal characteristics being a female, a household head or spouse increases the probability of doing housework, while being a grandparent/ in-law and being employed (62.7% of males while 38.2% of females older than 14 in our sample are employed) diminishes it. Interestingly, being more educated than the control case (< secondary school) increases the probability of doing housework, but this educational effect fades away for the upper educational strata (university degree).

Table 5: Probit regression - the probability of doing housework

Variable	*Coeficient*	*Significance*	*Std. Err.*
Female	1.072	***	0.023
Household head	0.278	***	0.035
Spouse	0.546	***	0.040
Son/ daughter	-0.056		0.032
Grandparents/ in Laws	-0.757	***	0.053
Has < university degree/ diploma	0.130	***	0.018
Has a diploma/ university degree	0.042		0.030
Employed	-0.115	***	0.017
Not household head in a female-headed household	-0.030		0.027
Presence of domestic servants	-0.881	***	0.106
HH has washing machine	-0.019		0.020
HH has car/ motorcycle	-0.048	***	0.016
Married without children	-0.067	**	0.028
Lone-parent families	0.220	***	0.031
Tri-generational families	0.028		0.022
Other family arrangements	0.139	***	0.047
Number of children	0.042	***	0.006
Number of females > 14	-0.103	***	0.009
Number of males > 14	-0.009		0.009
Second Income Quintile	0.083	***	0.020
Third Income Quintile	0.086	***	0.022
Fourth Income Quintile	0.123	***	0.025
Fifth Income Quintile	0.030		0.027
Constant	0.489	***	0.048
Observations	47689		
Pseudo-R2	0.1653		

Notes: ***Statistically significant at 99%; **Statistically significant at 95%; *Statitically significant at 90%.
Control variables not shown include males, other relatives, has < secondary school, not employed, two-parent family, first income quintile.

Table 5A: Probability of doing housework - change in point estimate probability

Variable	*Probability*
Baseline probability of doing housework [(a)]	*0.9792*
Male household head	-0.222
Female household head	-0.018
Employed	-0.007
HH has car/ motorcycle	-0.003
An extra child	0.002
An extra female > 14	-0.006
Second Income Quintile	0.004
Third Income Quintile	0.004
Fourth Income Quintile	0.005

[(a)] Baseline probability: female, spouse, less than university degree, not employed, neither domestic servants nor car/ motorcycle in the HH, two-parent HH, 1 child, 1female > 14 and 1male >14, first income quintile.

The probability of doing housework is positively correlated with the number of children, and it is statistically significant and greater in lone-parent and tri-generational families and in other family arrangements than in two-parent families. The same is true for the second, third and fourth income quintiles as compared to the first. The high correlation between the presence of domestic servants and the fifth income quintile might explain the absence of statistical significance of this latter variable.

Controls for time saving devices in the household included washing machine and car/motorcycle, with only the latter being statistically significant. The number of females and males over 14 are *proxies* for the possibility of distributing workload (and diminishing positive housework) with only the number of females being statistically significant. Table 5A, which reports effect sizes for some statistically significant variables[29], shows that an extra female over 14 reduces the probability of doing housework by 0.6pp.

The concurrent significance of family type and most family relationships (except for son/ daughter) test the hypothesis that life-cycle variables – those of the household and the individual as well – explain housework participation. However, it is *gender* that explains the most, since being a male household head reduces by 22pp the probability of doing housework as compared to the baseline case. This gendered pattern also emerges in the abovementioned 'help' provided by an extra contributing woman in the family (as opposed to an extra man). Being a female household head reduces the probability of doing housework 1.8pp, being employed reduces it 0.7pp and having a car/motorcycle in the household does so by 0.3pp. To the contrary, an extra child below 15 years of age increases the probability of doing housework by 0.2pp.

These effects are moderated by income quintile, with all individuals other than those living on a very low income participating in housework with higher probabilities (0.4pp increase in the second and third income quintiles and 0.5pp increase in the fourth income quintile; the exception being the fifth income quintile as was mentioned before)[30].

In a similar vein, the probability of doing childcare is tested for those family types in which children up to 15 years-old are present (lone-parent, tri-generational and other family arrangements with two-parent families being the control case). Table 6 reports that being a woman, spouse and more educated increases the probability of providing childcare – as opposed to being a male household head with less than secondary education. Being sons/daughters and grandparents/in-laws are negatively correlated with child-care, as well as being employed. Among household characteristics, the presence of both domestic servants and more 'contributing' members – be they women or men – reduce the probability of positive childcare; as expected, the number of children in the household increases it. In lone-parent families the probability of positive childcare is not significantly different from that of two-parent families, while it is greater in tri-generational families.

While the second income quintile does not statistically differ from the first income quintiles, all other income quintiles show positive correlation with childcare.

Again, women are shouldering the burden of unpaid care giving: the single most important effect in explaining the probability of doing child care is gender, with men reducing their probability of doing childcare by 31.3pp (Table 6A). Being a household head reduces it by 6.6pp and being employed reduces it by 1.2 pp. An extra child in the household impacts the probability of doing

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[29] Baseline probability has been selected based on control variables. Unreported significant variables are those in which the change in it does not produce positive cases *ceteris paribus* when tabulating probabilities. This applies to the three reported probit regressions.

[30] The hypothesis behind this result is that the positive effect stems from relatively higher male participation in housework when income increases (see below).

childcare more than it does the probability of doing housework, increasing it 3.4pp (as compared to 0.2pp) – another expected result. An extra woman older than 14 in the household contributes to reducing the probability of doing care work (6pp) more intensively than an extra man (2.7pp). Belonging to income quintiles other than the first and second increases the probability of doing childcare approximately 2pp.

Table 6: Probit regression - the probability of doing childcare if kids are present in the household

Variable	*Coeficient*	*Significance*	*Std. Err.*
Female	0.983	***	0.025
Household head	0.007		0.040
Spouse	0.285	***	0.042
Son/ daughter	-0.333	***	0.036
Grandparents/ in Laws	-0.765	***	0.070
Has < university degree/ diploma	0.153	***	0.021
Has a diploma/ university degree	0.192	***	0.034
Employed	-0.058	***	0.019
Not household head in a female-headed household	-0.015		0.031
Presence of domestic servants	-0.244	*	0.126
Lone-parent families	-0.060		0.038
Tri-generational families	0.256	***	0.023
Other family arrangements	-0.149	*	0.086
Number of children < 15	0.187	***	0.007
Number of women > 14	-0.254	***	0.011
Number of men > 14	-0.124	***	0.010
Second Income Quintile	0.031		0.021
Third Income Quintile	0.083	***	0.025
Fourth Income Quintile	0.108	***	0.030
Fifth Income Quintile	0.081	**	0.037
Constant	-0.107	**	0.052
Observations	27703		
Pseudo-R2	0.1969		

Notes: ***Statistically significant at 99%; **Statistically significant at 95%; *Statitically significant at 90%.
Control variables not shown include males, other relatives, has < secondary school, not employed, two-parent families, first income quintile.

Table 6A: Probability of doing childcare - change in point estimate probability

Variable	*Probability*
Baseline probability of doing childcare [(a)]	*0.8764*
Male	-0.313
Household head	-0.066
Employed	-0.012
An extra child	0.034
An extra women > 14	-0.060
An extra men > 14	-0.027
Third Income Quintile	0.016
Fourth Income Quintile	0.021
Fifth Income Quintile	0.016

[(a)] Baseline probability: female, spouse, less than university degree, not employed, neither domestic servants nor car/ motorcycle in the HH, two-parent family, 1 child, 1female > 14 and 1male >14, first income quintile.

B. The probability of being main child care provider if mother of young children

The second analytical stage benefits from information on childcare provision for young children (> 5 years-old). Selected mothers of young children (4,965) are the main care providers *of their youngest child*[31] in 82% of cases. Tables 7 and 7A report the result of a probit model with the correlates of being the main care provider.

[31] The focus is on mothers and childcare arrangements and not on children. Therefore, the characteristics of the youngest child are accrued to her/his mother. This in turn, might be behind the high percentage of main care

Notice that family relationships are not significant, but being a member of a female-headed household is in explaining why mothers are the main care providers. The more educated mothers are, the less likely they are the main care providers – even though they do engage in childcare work the more (see above) – a result that can be interpreted as their ability to combine care giving with other activities and make it less time-demanding. This is also the case for those employed (41%) and the availability of paid childcare both at home (10%) and at a childcare facility (19%)[32].

Table 7: Probit regression - the probability of being main care provider if mother of children <5

Variable	*Coeficient*	*Significance*	*Std. Err.*
Household head	-0.022		0.13
Has < university degree/ diploma	-0.160	***	0.06
Has a diploma/ university degree	-0.151	**	0.07
Employed	-1.455	***	0.06
Not household head in a female-headed household	0.243	***	0.09
Presence of domestic servants	-0.945	***	0.28
Childcare facility	-0.263	***	0.06
Lone-parent families	-0.237		0.15
Tri-generational families	-0.494	***	0.06
Other family arrangements	-0.647	**	0.31
Second Income Quintile	-0.024		0.06
Third Income Quintile	-0.115		0.07
Fourth Income Quintile	-0.088		0.08
Fifth Income Quintile	-0.093		0.10
Constant	2.122		0.06
Observations	4965		
Pseudo-R2	0.2489		

Notes: ***Statistically significant at 99%; **Statistically significant at 95%; *Statitically significant at 90%.
Control variables not shown include not household head, not employed, two-parent families, first income quintile.

Table 7A: Probability of being main care provider - change in point estimate probability

Variable	*Probability*
Baseline probability of being main care provider if mother [(a)]	*0.9831*
Employed	-0.235
Not household head in a female-headed household	-0.026
Childcare facility	-0.015
Tri-generational families	-0.035
Other family arrangements	-0.053

[(a)] Baseline probability: female, spouse, less than university degree, not employed, male HH head, neither domestic servants nor childcare facilities, two-parent family, first income quintile.

Income quintiles are not statistically significant but family type is in explaining whether a mother is a child's main care provider. Mothers in tri-generational and other family arrangements are less prone to be the main care provider, adding some support to the hypothesis that extended family arrangements can contribute to alleviate a mother's childcare workload. Table 7A shows this latter effect by reporting that the probability of being the main care provider decreases by 3.5pp in tri-

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providers among mothers (which is more probable the younger the child is). However, even if there are older children that are not taken care of exclusively by his/her mother, the fact that the youngest is in her charge leaves her with considerable unpaid work responsibilities and restricts mothers' participation in the labor market.

[32] These latter variables are *proxies*. Paid childcare at home is estimated to be provided by domestic servants while the availability of a childcare facility is estimated by child attendance by any household's child < 5.

generational families and by 5.3pp in other family arrangements. It is also noticeable that while being a household head does not significantly alter the probability of mothers being the main care providers, it does so living in a female headed household.

The single most important effect is being employed, accounting for a decrease in baseline probability of 23.5pp. The interaction of these variables might explain the reasons behind income differences being irrelevant in explaining the probability of mothers being the main care providers. Given the absence of widespread childcare facilities, mother's employment becomes feasible if the family is resourceful enough to take care of children while mothers work; something that might be guaranteed if the household is larger in size (tri-generational) or female-headed. Being employed in turn appears as a *proxy* for obtaining an income, therefore raising probabilities of improving material conditions and family living standards.

C. Shares of unpaid work

OLS regressions for females and males are reported in Table 8. They show the change in percentage points in unpaid work share[33] according to individual and household's characteristics. Unpaid workload per person in hours – as a measure of household equitable workload by 'contributing' member – as well as paid working hours have also been included as explanatory variables, being statistically significant for both women and men. As before, with the exception of 'number of children', 'number of females > 14' and 'number of males > 14', all other variables are dummies either for the individual or the household[34]. Both models included constant terms.

[33] The dependent variable has been calculated as the log of the individual share in total household's unpaid work hours, while unpaid workload per individual > 14 (one of the explanatory variables) is calculated as household unpaid work hours/ members >14.

[34] Therefore, coefficients are interpreted as the variation in unpaid work share of an extra hour (if variables are measured in hours), of an extra person (if measured in number of females/males/children) or of the change between 0 to 1 in the case of *dummies*.

Table 8: OLS regression - change in unpaid work share if variable changes in one unit

	Females			Males		
Variable	*Coeficient*	*Significance*	*Std. Err.*	*Coeficient*	*Significance*	*Std. Err.*
Unpaid workload per individual > 14	-0.037	***	0.001	-0.005	***	0.001
Paid hours per day	-0.005	***	0.000	-0.002	***	0.000
Has < university degree/ diploma	0.027	***	0.008	0.044	***	0.012
Has a diploma/ university degree	0.002		0.012	0.087	***	0.021
Spouse	0.238	***	0.012	0.187	***	0.039
Son/ daughter	-0.432	***	0.012	-0.199	***	0.014
Grandparents/ in Laws	-0.238	***	0.024	-0.002		0.069
Grandchildren	-0.412	***	0.033	-0.112	**	0.045
Other relatives	-0.042	***	0.006	-0.025	***	0.009
Other non-relatives	-0.260	***	0.068	-0.095		0.087
Not household head in a female-headed household	0.011		0.013	-0.061	***	0.020
Presence of domestic servants	0.004		0.061	0.044		0.098
Second Income Quintile	-0.008		0.009	-0.019		0.014
Third Income Quintile	-0.014		0.010	-0.030	**	0.015
Fourth Income Quintile	-0.034	***	0.011	0.012		0.016
Fifth Income Quintile	-0.040	***	0.013	0.033	*	0.019
Lone-parent families	0.246	***	0.013	0.343	***	0.021
Tri-generational families	0.113	***	0.010	0.067	***	0.015
Other family arrangements	0.152	***	0.023	0.340	***	0.033
Number of females >14	-0.291	***	0.004	-0.290	***	0.007
Number of males >14	-0.125	***	0.004	-0.146	***	0.006
Number of children < 15	0.020	***	0.002	-0.016	***	0.004
Constant	-0.018		0.016	-0.874	***	0.021
Observations	21291			14067		
R2	0.541			0.286		

Notes: ***Statistically significant at 99%; **Statistically significant at 95%; *Statitically significant at 90%.
Controls: household head; < secondary school; first income quintile; two-parent family.

A comparative analysis of both regressions – even if the female model fits the data better than the male model– sheds light on how unpaid workload is distributed according to gender norms. Particularly striking is the constant term in the male regression, which is statistically significant and refers to the baseline case – a male household head in a two-parent family, with low education in the first income quintile – who participates in unpaid work 87pp *less* than all other males.

Turning to fixed effects, an extra paid hour a day results in decreasing both females' and males' share in unpaid work, but does so more intensively among women than men[35]. Same sign effects emerge in relation to an extra hour of workload per 'contributing' individual, making females decrease their unpaid work share in 3.7pp, while men do so 0.5pp. The contribution effect is greater than the workload effect, meaning that marginal household unpaid hours can be redistributed more easily (particularly in the case of women). However, it is evident that both females and males redistribute their workload more intensively towards other women in the household than to men: an extra contributing female member causes both females' and males' share to decrease 29pp, while an extra contributing male member causes shares to decrease 12.5pp and 14.6pp respectively. Unexpectedly, an extra child increases females' unpaid work share (by 2pp) but *decreases* males' share (by 1.6pp).

Being a spouse (as opposed to being household head) increases unpaid work share by 24pp among women and 19pp among men. To the contrary, being any other relative or non-relative is statistically significant and decreases unpaid work share among women (by 43pp if a daughter; 24pp if grandparent/in-law; 41pp if grandchild; 4pp if other relative and 26pp if other non-

[35] Conversely, not being employed or working fewer hours for pay has a smaller impact in unpaid work contribution in men (e.g. 8 hours of paid work per day less would mean an increase in unpaid work share of 1.6pp).

relative). Among men, statistically significant family relationships are being a son (-20pp), a grandchild (-11pp) or other relative (-2pp).

Household monetary income is related to unpaid share particularly in the case of women, who see a decrease in their share if belonging to the fourth (-3pp) or the fifth (-4pp) income quintiles. Only males' share in the fifth income quintile differs significantly and positively from that of the first income quintile.

Family type is in itself a source of differences in unpaid workload share for both females and males, and it is particularly intense among the latter. Men increase their share by 34pp in lone-parent families and also in other family arrangements. They also increase their share if living in tri-generational families by 7pp, but decrease it if living in a female headed household (-6pp). Women's unpaid work share increases by 25pp in lone-parent families, by 15pp in other family arrangements and by 11pp in tri-generational families. The presence of domestic servants is not significant in explaining unpaid work shares (as they might be correlated to unpaid work levels and not to its distribution).

In sum, living in families other than the norm (the two-parent family), being a spouse, not employed and relatively educated increases the share of unpaid work both men and women take up. Only women in the uppermost income quintiles are able to reduce their share, with the only stronger negative impact stemming from extra 'contributing' household members –other women. Childcare emerges again as women's work.

VII. Unpaid Work During the Last Argentine Crisis

According to the previous account which depicted family time allocation in 2001, it is clear that housework and childcare work throughout the crisis was taken up by women, particularly those spouses who were not employed and lived in two-parent families.

Female household heads, particularly those employed and living in lone-parent families participated less in housework than the base case, though not substantially. They did relatively less childcare work, but the effect of being employed and a household head could have been more than offset if there are more children in the family. Mothers of infants, in turn, were in most cases their main care providers, with the probability of being so decreasing only in cases in which they managed to be employed.

Spouses, household heads and mothers were precisely the women who massively turned to the *Jefes* Plan to do extra work for pay as a way to compensate for household income losses[36]. Making use of previous estimations, the impact on women's unpaid work and the consequences on intra-household housework and care work reallocation can be inferred.

Indeed, if unemployed household heads –the Plan's target–, women's shift towards paid work must have hardly freed them from taking up housework and childcare work, possibly putting them under considerable stress (MacDonald *et al,* 2005). The four hours a day that these women had to work for pay to comply with the Plan's basic requirement must have decreased their unpaid workload share by only 2pp, which means that as a consequence of being *Jefes* Plan's beneficiaries they started having the 'double (paid/unpaid work) shift'. These effects must have been amplified by living in families other than the two-parent norm, in which unpaid work shares were greater.

[36] Notice the most extreme effects of the crisis were felt over 2002, and the *Jefes* Plan was put into place by May 2002, less than a year after ECV-01 was collected.

These estimations show that the crisis hit Argentine women particularly hard not only in their partaking in labor markets, as shown in section 2, but also in their active role in pushing forward strategies centered around them as 'providers of last resort'[37]. As in other contexts of economic turmoil (UNDP, 1999), family cost-bearing strategies at the height of the Argentinean crisis have by no means been gender-neutral. Women must have found themselves caught in the imperative of undertaking low-pay low-quality paid work without substantially diminishing their unpaid work burden, in order to counterbalance their families' extreme deterioration in living conditions.

Data above also show that women's extremely *fast* response to the *Jefes* Plan (applications were received between April and mid-May 2002 *only*) must have been related to a widespread presence of a discouraged-worker effect among women, that made supply side factors adjust rapidly to the availability of jobs[38] (Cortes *et al,* 2004). Conversely, given the persistence of traditional gender patterns in the distribution of reproductive labour – and the absence of social infrastructure, particularly childcare facilities – families who could not adjust reproductive work to free members to enter the labour market (mothers of young children in small households, for instance) were *de facto* penalized by not getting a much needed income transfer.

Families must have also faced the redistribution of domestic and care work when male employment rates plummeted and men lost their jobs more frequently than women. However, given the statistically significant but low unpaid workload redistribution tendencies, unemployed men's contribution to reproductive work must have been small.

These quantitative effects of crisis –the probability of taking up unpaid work and women's and men's reproductive working shares resulting from *once and for all* changes in women's and men's paid work– do not exhaust all crisis effects on the reallocation of paid and unpaid work. Pure price effects –in particular, the upsurge in poverty– cannot be traced using the framework developed above, since it is not possible to know the ways in which the deterioration of wages and real per capita income could have altered individual's reproductive housework in ways other than in traceable changes in paid work[39]. 'Invisible' impacts could have ranged from changing consumption patterns (to more income-saving, time-using ones) to putting children to work, as more qualitative crisis accounts show.

Lastly, there is evidence that women in upper income strata behaved differently during the crisis. Interestingly enough, while income strata is equally relevant to explaining housework and childcare participation of both women and men (mothers of infants living in households with *per capita* incomes greater than the first income quintile are not statistically different from mothers in the first quintile), gender differences arise when analysing shares of unpaid workload. Indeed, while women in the fourth and fifth income quintiles have shares that are approximately 4pp less than women in the first quintile, men in the same strata do not significantly differ from men in the first income quintile *or increase their workload share* (as it is the case in the fifth income quintile), indicating that more equal arrangements are coupled with high income levels.

The presence of domestic servants, found to be statistically significant in explaining housework and care work participation, also points to the fact that families who can afford live-in domestics are able to 'commodify' part of their housework and childcare burdens (CEPAL, 2003), a 'privilege' that neither women nor men have in the lower income strata.

[37] Similarly, Benería (2003) terms women the 'equilibrating factor' when household income shrinks, allowing for household coping strategies based on increased paid and unpaid work.
[38] And not necessarily to wages, since *Jefes'* wages were below poverty-line wages.
[39] Wealth-effects, more related to middle-income families, are also left unanalyzed (see Floro and Dymski, 2000).

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

Income-based accounts of the profound and persistent deterioration of well-being in Argentina –a long term process that started well before devaluation and has not reversed completely after three years of continuous GDP growth– capture only partially the critical change in living conditions brought about by economic depression.

Crisis itself developed on an 'invisible' arena of inequality in the levels (participation) and distribution of unpaid work within families, correlated with gender, life-cycle, income strata, workload burden and 'contributions' stemming from different family members according to family type. Among these effects, gender is the single most important one in determining the way reproductive work is allocated, pointing to the fact that pervasive cultural gender stereotypes are of outmost importance in explaining women's high unpaid housework and care work burdens (and shares) during the crisis.

The paper made use of the *Jefes* Plan outcomes to illustrate some of the effects the deterioration in macroeconomic conditions must have had on reproductive labor. It shows that by shouldering the need for extra income, women made theirs and other members' unpaid housework and care work *flexible* beyond what was predictable on traditional, gender-blind evaluations, proving at the same time the incompleteness of those evaluations and the deepness of the social and economic crisis.

Conclusions are two-fold. At a macroeconomic level, the Argentinean crisis had deep gendered effects, some of which were not different in nature and extent from other crisis experiences.. Argentine women kept and actively sought paid work to compensate for the fall in family income brought about by inflation and job losses like their counterparts in South East Asia had done not long before (UN, 1999). In doing so, women actively intervened in the tension between aggregate benefit (defined as the difference between total production and subsistence costs) and the social definition of subsistence levels, putting a limit to an unprecedented deterioration of living conditions[40]. In other words, women stood at the crossroads between productive and reproductive spheres, working in both to guarantee minimum well-being levels for them and their families (Picchio, 2003; Sen, 1995 cited in Elson, 1995).

At the social policy level, there is the risk of reading these results on the effect of the *Jefes* Plan on unpaid labor shares as a plea to free women from their *paid workload,* as *Jefes* Plan continuation –*Familias* Plan– has intended[41]. On the contrary, gender aware social policy responses should seek to provide women with formal and stable jobs, avoiding their clustering in the most vulnerable labor market segments; to enhance social infrastructure (particularly childcare facilities); to equalize care commodification opportunities; and to contribute to gender equality in reproductive work by (at least) avoiding embedding gender stereotypes in social policy design.

[40] As Picchio (1994) puts it, the tension between aggregate benefits and living conditions opposes dominant elites with the entire working population, a fight in which the whole life-cycle is at stake.

[41] *Familias* Plan seeks to support mothers in their devoting full time to their children by giving them a cash-transfer equivalent to the *Jefes* Plan ($150 to $275, depending on the number of children). Only if no woman is present in the household can the benefit be accrued to a man.

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